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Introduction: From pro-poor to middle class growth 
 
Growth that is shared, broad-based, inclusive—there are various terms—is now widely embraced 
as the central economic goal for developing countries.  A key contribution of the Spence 
Commission on Growth (formally the Growth Commission) was its emphasis on shared growth.   
 
But the concept of shared or inclusive growth is not well defined in the development economics 
literature.  Since the early 1990s, (and probably best marked by the influential 1990 World 
Development Report of the World Bank), the focus has been primarily on pro-poor growth, with 
the ―poor‖ viewed as people living on less than $1 day, or in some regions $2 day. The idea of 
pro-poor growth emerged in the early 1990s as a counterpoint to a singular concern with growth 
alone (measured in terms of increases in per capita income).
1  Pro-poor growth is generally 
defined as growth which benefits the poor at least as much or more than the rest of the 
population, and as the good outcome of policies and programs that are targeted to improving the 
lives and capacities of the very poor while not undermining growth itself.  Examples include the 
emphasis on primary compared to higher education on the part of donors over the last several 
decades, as an assured way to provide a benefit to the poor while investing in long-run growth 
through increases in human capital, and the satisfaction with the successful implementation of 
conditional cash transfers, which are highly targeted to the poor while minimizing the fiscal 
burden on the public sector and thus any tradeoff with growth associated with a higher tax 
burden or reduced alternative growth-oriented public investment.  
 
Yet these pro-poor, inclusive policies are not necessarily without tradeoffs in fostering long-run 
growth. 
2 In this paper I argue that the concept of inclusive growth should go beyond the 
traditional emphasis on the poor (and the rest) and take into account changes in the size and 
economic command of the group conventionally defined as neither poor nor rich, i.e. the middle 
class.  My main rationale is that growth driven by and benefiting a middle class is more likely to 
be sustained – both economically to the extent that the problems of rent-seeking and corruption 
associated with highly concentrated gains to growth are avoided; and politically to the extent that 
conflict and horizontal inequalities between racial and ethnic groups are easier to manage when 
                                                      
 
1 World Bank (1990).  See also Ravallion (1998) and Ravallion and Chen (2001) for two of those authors‘ singular 
contributions, and Kraay (2006). 
2 The emphasis on primary compared to higher education ignores the lack of clear evidence that the former has 
higher social returns than the latter, once unmeasured positive externalities are properly taken into account  (Birdsall 
1996), and may have led to the underfunding of higher education in developing countries in the last three decades. 
Levy (2008) suggests conditional cash transfers and other pro-poor programs in Mexico have not sufficiently taken 
into account tradeoffs in how ―social‖ programs and subsidies affect economy-wide incentives for investment and 
productivity. 2 
 
not only is the overall size of the pie growing but everyone is enjoying bigger slices. 
3  On the 
positive side, sustained growth is arguably more likely where a politically salient middle class 
supports in its own economic interests the sound and stable political and economic institutions 
that encourage investment by ensuring the rule of law and recognition of private property rights.
4   
 
Both middle-income and low-income countries have been and are far more vulnerable to various 
economic shocks (weather, terms of trade) than are industrialized economies,
5 and recent studies 
suggest that sustained growth for prolonged periods of 10 years and more has been more elusive 
in the developing world than shorter periods of ―accelerated growth‖.
6  Short periods of growth 
are often due to in fact to positive shocks such as a favorable but temporary shift in the terms of 
trade for a country (as in the case of a commodity boom of 2002-2008), or the discovery of oil or 
another natural resource (whose world price may be volatile), or the arrival of a skilled and 
committed leader, or the resolution of a war or internal conflict. Particularly in the light of the 
2008-2010 global economic crisis (as I write in mid-2009), the question is whether a good-sized 
middle class, however defined, makes countries more resilient in the face of shocks – internal 
political shocks as well as external financial and weather shocks.  
 
The purpose of the paper is modest.  I do not presume to make a larger and more economically 
commanding ―middle class‖ an input to any model of growth
7. In fact as I will show, the 
emergence of a middle class using my definition is closely associated with growth, and is 
probably an outcome of growth as much or more than an input to growth.  The same virtuous or 
reinforcing circle might be said of the middle class and democracy, the middle class and ―sound‖ 
institutions and so on.  
 
Instead it is to suggest a definition of the middle class in developing countries that emphasizes 
the alignment of its economic interests with sound economic policies and good governance – and 
thus its indispensability to sustainable economic growth --  while allowing for the reality that it is 
subject to the risks as well as opportunities of a globally integrated economy.  (Because this 
notion of its indispensable nature is a hypothesis not a finding, or a presumption not a 
conclusion, I hedge and put the term in parentheses in the title.) I first set out and defend my 
definition.  I then provide some description of the size and economic command of the 
(indispensably) middle class across countries and over time.  I conclude with some possible 
implications for domestic and international policy given the evidence of how small and fragile 
this   class still is in developing countries. 
 
                                                      
3 Birdsall (2007) reviews and summarizes the literature on the effects of income distribution on growth.  See 
especially Stewart (2001) on Horizontal Inequality: A Neglected Dimension of Development, as well as Rodrik and 
Alesina (1999) on inequality and managing policy tradeoffs.  
4 Acemoglu, Johnson  and Robinson, 2004 
5 Perry (2009). 
6 Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2004) report that ―external shocks tend to produce growth accelerations that 
eventually fizzle out, while economic reform is a statistically significant predictor of growth accelerations that are 
sustained.‖ 
7 Easterly (2001) does so, defining the three middle quintiles which in many countries will include people living 
below the poverty line, as ―middle class‖.  3 
 
This paper complements a small but growing literature by development economists defining and 
exploring empirically the ―middle class‖ in developing countries.
8   It is recent and small because 
of the laser-like focus in the donor community on reducing absolute poverty and its curses of ill 
health and poor access to education; and to some extent because of a prevailing assumption that 
the middle class in developing countries competes with the poor politically and economically – 
preferring to enhance its own access to state jobs and spending, and to preserve its limited 
privileges.  This may indeed have been and be the case, particularly in countries where the 
majority of households that appear to be ―middle class‖ are highly dependent on the state.  
However, the fact is that the prevailing assumption refers only vaguely to who are middle class 
households in the first place.   
 
But what about the absolute poor? 
 
In any event, a focus on the middle class does not imply a lack of concern for the poor.  To the 
contrary; in the advanced economies the poor have probably benefited from the rule of law, legal 
protections, and in general the greater accountability of government that a large and politically 
independent middle class demands, and from the universal and adequately funded education, 
health and social insurance programs a middle class wants and finances through the tax system.
9  
A focus on the middle class does not exclude a focus on the poor but extends it, including on the 
grounds that growth that is good for the large majority of people in developing countries is more 
likely to be economically and politically sustainable, both for economic and political reasons.
 10  
The political economy of targeted transfers provides an example.  Besley and Kanbur (1990) and 
Gelbach and Pritchett (2000) among others argue that ―leakier can be better‖, i.e. attempts to 
tighten targeting to reduce fiscal costs and reach only the truly poor can be counterproductive if 
the programs as a result lose the political support of the middle class. 
 
On the other hand, if a focus on the middle class is merely a simple extension of caring about the 
poor, then the question arises of whether the distinction between pro-poor and middle class 
growth has any implications for policy. Below I argue that in fact it probably does.  In the case of 
cash transfers, the optimal degree of targeting depends structurally on the size and characteristics 
of the middle class.  More generally a singular focus on the poor may from a policy point of view 
ignore tradeoffs that matter for the middle class, which in turn might undermine the 
macroeconomic stability and the social policies that the middle class tends to support – and that 
in turn may also benefit the poor (if perhaps less directly in the short run).   
 
In the end, the possible tensions or tradeoffs between strictly pro-poor and more inclusive and 
sustainable ―middle-class‖ growth policies cannot be generalized.  They need to be assessed 
policy by policy in each country, and are likely to change over time as circumstances change.  
The implication is that policymakers in developing countries (and their international supporters 
and advisers) should be more systematic than has been the case in the last several decades in 
                                                      
8 Including Birdsall, Graham and Pettinato (2000); Milanovic and Yitzhaki (2002); Banerjee and Duflo (2008); 
Ravallion (2009); and Silber (2007). 
9 This is one interpretation of Lindert‘s analysis (2004). See also Skopcol (1979). Provision of public goods is lower 
where there is inequality of income, especially between different ethnic or other groups (Alesina, et al. 1999)..  
 
10 Birdsall (2007) summarizes the evidence of this for Africa, based on Hausmann, Pritchett, and Rodrik (2004) who 
present evidence that many countries that have had long growth episodes subsequently have growth collapses. 4 
 
considering weighted welfare outcomes when selecting and fine-tuning macro policies, rather 
than either unweighted growth outcomes or overly weighted poverty outcomes.  A second 
implication is that where there are no obvious tradeoffs between benefits for the poor vs. the 
middle class, all the better. The real tradeoff may well be between the rich and the rest, and 
between short-term stability or high aggregate growth that preserves the status quo benefiting a 
small minority at the top of the income distribution vs. the political risks and lower short-run 
growth of financial, tax, social insurance, land market and other policies that are conducive to 
building a middle class and also, as it turns out, pro-poor as well. 
11  
 
Defining the (indispensable) middle class in developing countries 
 
Inclusive growth implies an increase in the proportion of people in the middle class (implying 
some exit of people out of poverty), and in the proportion of total income they command, 
implying gains in the middle at the ―expense‖ either of the initially poor or the initially rich.
12  I 
define the ―middle class‖ in the developing world to include people at or above the equivalent of 
$10 day in 2005, and at or below the 95
th percentile of the income distribution in their own 
country
13. This definition implies some absolute and global threshold ($10 day) below which 
people are too poor to be middle class in any society in today‘s globally integrated economy, and 
some relative and local threshold (the 95
th percentile of income/consumption) above which 
people are at least in their own society ―rich‖.  Below I sometimes refer to the group as the 
politically potent or independent middle class to distinguish it from other definitions and to 
emphasize the logic behind this income/consumption definition. 
 
Why $10 day at the bottom? 
 
I suggest $10 a day (in 2005 purchasing power parity terms) as the absolute minimum income for 
a person to have the economic security associated with middle class status in today‘s global 
economy – and therefore the incentives and the potential to exercise political rights in his or her 
own interests.   
 
Why have an absolute rather than a country-specific minimum level?  Many conventional 
definitions assign to ―middle class‖ in each country those in the middle of the distribution in that 
country – whether the three middle quintiles or those between 75 and 125 percent of median 
income (though where I have used the latter the discussion was primarily of the ―middle stratum‖ 
                                                      
11 This may be the right way to assess the tradeoff the Obama Administration faces in the design of the TARP 
program for ridding banks of toxic assets.  The private-public partnership as outlined appears to favor potentially 
high gains to those with current financial wealth and a potentially higher eventual tax burden (on the middle class) 
over a higher risk and less costly takeover or ―nationalization‖ of the banks – in part because of the political limit to 
immediate additional funding of any bank ―rescues‖.   
12 These implications depend in part on the relative gains or declines in income and share of the initially rich; the 
statements assume that the rich are not losing in absolute terms. Silber (2007) suggests an alternative measure of the 
economic command of the middle class which does not depend on what happens to the incomes of the poor or the 
rich. 
13 For other recent definitions, see World Bank (2007); Birdsall, Graham and Pettinato (2000); Banerjee and Duflo, 
2008 and Ravallion (2009).  Defining the top 5 percent of people in every country as ―rich‖ implies that of the 
approximately 14 million people in the U.S with 2002 monthly income at or above $9,504 (2005 PPP) are ―rich‖, 
while the approximately 26 million in urban China with 2005 monthly incomes of just $372 are rich, and the 40 
million in rural China with 2005 monthly incomes of just $168 are rich. 5 
 
not ―middle class‖).
 14   I propose an absolute minimum on the grounds that in the relatively open 
economies of most developing countries today, with economic security to some extent 
vulnerable to external as well as internal economic and political shocks (including weather, 
financial crises and so on -- consider the food and fuel price spikes in 2008), as well as  some 
consumption standards set at the global level (a car for example if not everywhere a Lexus), 
some absolute minimum makes sense. 
 
Why $10? $10 a day is a high minimum compared to the conventional global absolute poverty 
line now used by the World Bank of $1.25 a day.
15  It is also high compared to the $2 day 
national poverty lines conventionally used in much of Latin America and in other middle-income 
regions and countries.  
 
There is certainly no agreement among development economists of an income minimum of 
middle class status in a developing country.  Banerjee and Duflo (2007) designate as middle 
class in developing countries people living between $2 and $10 a day – essentially assigning all 
those that have escaped the recognized poverty line of $2 a day (poverty but not extreme 
poverty) to ―middle class‖ status. Ravallion designates as middle class in developing countries 
all those living between $2 and $13 a day, similarly defining the developing world‘s middle class 
as those who are not deemed ―poor‖ by the standards of developing countries but are poor by the 
standards of rich countries, and capping the developing world middle class at a figure close to 
the poverty line in the United States – so by definition his middle class is meant to be non-
Western and specific to developing countries.     
 
However there are good arguments for rejecting the idea that anyone who escapes the absolute 
poverty associated with living on just $2 a day is a member of the ―middle class‖ in his or her 
own country, let alone globally.  Being a member of the middle class in the classic sense implies 
a reasonable level of economic security.  Yet in most middle-income developing countries, even 
$3 day is not enough to be economically secure.  Ravallion (2008), makes the point that national 
poverty lines rise markedly across developing countries with average income; that reflects the 
reality that security with respect to basic needs is difficult to define in absolute terms (as Adam 
Smith famously noted it is about the proper hat that makes a man feel presentable in his 
community). Moreover there is considerable evidence that the number of people that live below 
the international poverty lines of $1 or $2 a day is substantially greater over several months or 
years in developing countries than the number that are poor at any one moment. Pritchett, 
Suryahadi, and Sumarto (2000) use panel data to estimate, for example, that while the headcount 
poverty rate may be 20 percent in Indonesia in 1997, an additional 10 to 30 percent face an acute 
risk of poverty in the near future based on past churning of households in and out of poverty. 
Similarly, Kanbur and Lustig (2000) record substantial increases in ―poverty‖ conventionally 
defined during crises, simply because a high proportion of the non-poor live so close to the 
poverty line – where they are vulnerable during a downturn, presumably because their permanent 
income is too low for them to have accumulated the precautionary savings or assets typical of 
middle class households to ride out a downturn.  
                                                      
14 For an example using the three middle quintiles, see Easterly (2001); for those close to the median see Birdsall, 
Graham and Pettinato (2000).  Thurow (1987) also uses the latter definition. 
15 Ravallion (2009) explains the basis for this measure of poverty; it is close to the median of the national poverty 
lines of the 15 or so poorest countries in the world. 6 
 
 
In fact even $10 day is low compared to the national poverty lines of OECD countries. Aiming 
for a more globally comparable income standard, Milanovic and Yitzaki (2002) designate the 
middle class as those living between the mean incomes of Brazil and Italy, i.e. between about 
$12 and $50 (in 2000 purchasing power parity terms).  With the exception of the United States, 
OECD countries define their poverty lines in relative terms, as 50 percent of median income.
 16 
That standard implies poverty lines in PPP terms of about $30 day.  The U.S. poverty line is 
based on the cost of a minimum nutritional basket and has not been updated in many years to 
reflect real increases in costs; however even in the U.S. the poverty line for a single individual in 




Finally it is likely that most people in developing countries living on $10 a day have surprisingly 
low (to many Western readers) social indicators.  Infant mortality in the top quintile of 
households in Brazil (where daily income per capita is close to $10 or more among the least 
affluent) was above 15 per thousand in the mid-1990s – similar to the rate among the notoriously 
underserved (and generally poor) African-American population in Washington D.C. and twice 
the rate in the most ―deprived‖ areas of Great Britain.
18  The ―rich‖ in Bolivia and Ghana are 
even worse off – infant mortality of households in the richest quintile in Bolivia (2003) was 32 
and Ghana (2003) 58 per 1,000, and in the 1990s in Ghana as many as 10 percent of children in 
the richest quintile were stunted, implying chronic malnutrition.
19  In fact the low social 
indicators among the richest 20 percent of households in low-income countries like Bolivia and 
Ghana are consistent with their income levels; it is just that except for a tiny proportion of 
households in those countries (far tinier than the 20 percent in the top quintile), as will be clear 
below, most people are income (or consumption) ―poor‖ in the sense that their per capita daily 
income is far below $10.   
 
In the end, $10 as a lower limit is admittedly ad hoc; it is in the right range – clearly on the low 
side by OECD standards but close to a minimum for a global standard. Behind this ad hoc 
number is the idea that somewhere around $10 a day per person household members are able to 
care about and save for the future and to have aspirations for a better life for themselves as well 
as their children – because they feel reasonably secure economically (short of the kind of global 
recession of today, a once in 60 years event). Economic security implies that during the 
downturns of the normal business cycle a household is unlikely to need to sell household or 
business assets or take children out of school, and is insured through savings or formal insurance 
arrangements against such idiosyncratic risks as a family health catastrophe or a brief spell of 
                                                      
16 Pritchett (2003), Table 4, lists 50 percent of median incomes for 13 OECD countries in 2000 PPP terms, which 
have an unweighted average of the countries listed of $33.95 day. Ravallion, Chen, and Sangraula (2008) objects to 
this informal measure of poverty using one-half the median on the grounds that it implies that an equi-proportionate 
increase in all incomes across a distribution would not change the poverty rate, whereas above some level of 
income, the income elasticity of national poverty lines though positive is less than one.  
17 US poverty lines are extracted from the 2008 Health and Human Services Guidelines. 
18 As reported by Pritchett (2003). Pritchett also presents data showing that fewer than 25 percent of people in the 
richest quintile in India complete 9 grades of school, compared to nearly universal completion of basic education in 
industrialized countries.      
19 Birdsall and Menezes (2004), as reported by World Bank online data based on Demographic and Health Surveys 
(DHS). The child stunting statistics are from the DHS data on Bolivia (1998) and Ghana (1993). 7 
 
personal unemployment. At an income level around $10 a day per person, feeling secure, people 
in this middle class are prepared to take reasonable business and other economic risks, and thus 
to be entrepreneurial capitalists.  A measure of economic security also makes a household less 
vulnerable to patronage or clientelist political pressures and implies a greater likelihood of 
readiness to act politically to demand the economic policies that protect private property and 
encourage private investment.  
 
And $10 has the advantage (like the original $1 a day poverty line) of being a round number. 
 
Why the 95
th percentile at the top? 
 
The relative maximum, which obviously varies across countries, can be thought of as excluding 
that portion of the population within a country whose income is most likely to be from inherited 
wealth, or based on prior or current economic rents associated with monopoly or other privileges, 
and thus less associated with productive and primarily labor activity than for the non-rich.  
 
In an earlier note I set the threshold above which a household would be defined as rich at the 90
th 
decile of income; that seemed reasonable because across almost all developing countries for 
which there is information on the distribution of income, the ratio of average income (household 
income per capita) of the 10
th to the 9
th deciles ranges from two to more than five, and is far 
greater than the ratio of income of the 9
th to the 8
th deciles.  (For OECD countries the 10/9 ratio 
also exceeds the 9/8 ratio but is usually below two.)   
 
For two reasons in this paper I have modified the definition of the middle class to exclude only 
the top 5 percent of households. First, in most of the poorer developing countries (hereafter 
―low-income‖ using the World Bank classification of countries
20) household income per capita 
(in 2005) even at the 90
th decile was below $10 a day; it seemed unreasonable to assume that 10 
percent of all households in Ghana, Guatemala and India, with income or consumption below 
$10 day, were relying primarily on non-productive income. Second, further scrutiny of income 
distribution data for most developing countries suggests that the cumulative distribution has an 
inflection point (where the second derivative becomes positive) not at or around the 90
th decile 
but at or even above the 95
th decile (which in simplified form is evident by comparing the ratios 
in Figure 1).  At and above that inflection point income tends to be even more concentrated.   
 
At the same time, the 95th percentile is as arbitrary a cutoff at the top as is $10 at the bottom in 
defining a country-based indispensable middle class.  There is no empirical basis to assume in 
any particular country that a household at the 96
th percentile of per capita income or consumption 
is more reliant on income from capital or privileges or ―rents‖ broadly speaking than a household 
at the 94
th percentile; in fact in low-income countries the relevant cutoff at the top may be much 
higher, as income/consumption per capita even at the 95
th percentile is still below $10 a day (for 
example in Ghana and India -- more on India below). Ideally the threshold above which a 
household is too ―rich‖ to be ―middle class‖ would be estimated for each country on the basis of 
                                                      
20 The World Bank income classification is based on 2007 GNI per capita. The low income classification is assigned 
to countries with a GNI per capita of $935 or less; lower middle income, $936 - $3,705; upper middle income, 
$3,706 - $11,455; and high income, $11,456 or more. 8 
 
information about financial and other assets, sources of income and the nature of employment.
 21   
The advantage of choosing the percentile threshold is that it reflects the reality that within 
countries relative and not just absolute income matters, especially in the political context.  
 
Why an income or consumption measure vs. education, occupation or other traditional 
measures? 
 
I use information from household surveys to ―count‖ the middle class and its proportion of total 
income in various countries and years based on household income or consumption per capita, 
between the early 1990s and 2005 or the most recent other year available.  It would be better to 
―count‖ the middle class on the basis of a reliable measure of permanent income, but measuring 
permanent income is a task in itself, and no reasonable measures of permanent income are 
available over time and across countries.  Consumption is a better measure of permanent income 
than current income, and is generally lower for households the lower their income.  A still better 
measure is probably education of the household head or all adults in the household.
22  But 
education of the household head is not sensitive to changes in the economic environment except 
over longer periods. An index of household assets, such as that developed by Filmer and 
Pritchett (2001) would also provide a better indicator of permanent income than current 
consumption/income.  Table 1 below provides some information on the types of assets owned by 
households in several countries.
23  This does not of course solve the problem of using current 
income to define the middle class, but it does provide some indicator of its reasonableness. 
 
The middle class and income-based identity 
 
Members of the middle class are more likely to play the positive political role in the provision of 
accountable government, e.g. in supporting the rule of law, property rights, and taxes to finance 
public goods such as education, to the extent they identify with each other as ―middle class‖ with 
identifiable and distinct interests from the rich and the poor. Measures of income polarization are 
based on the relevance of such ―identification‖
24. Ideas about ―identity‖ by economists (the most 
notable being that of George Akerlof
25) are also discussed in the context of ethnic or gender 
identity; but there is also the concept of income identity as in studies of the black or African-
American middle class in the United States.   
 
A simple measure of potential income/consumption identity is the Gini coefficient of the middle 
class itself.  Table 2 shows the Gini coefficient of income/consumption inequality of the 
members of the middle class using my definition in each country/year.  Except for several 
countries in Latin America, the Gini coefficients are generally between a very low 0.1 and 0.2 
(and generally as would be expected lower for the consumption-based survey countries), 
                                                      
21 Data on household wealth and its distribution are now available for a limited number of developing countries. See 
Davies et al. 2008. 
22 Sociologists have traditionally identified the middle class in Western societies on the basis of education and 
occupation in a white collar job.   
23 We identified the ―middle class‖ in these countries by imposing the income/consumption distributions based on 
the World Bank PovCal estimates and my income/consumption cutoffs on the asset distributions developed by 
Filmer and Pritchett using the Demographic and Health survey data. 
24 See Foster and Wolfson, (1992), and Wolfson, (1994) 
25 See Akerlof and Kranton (2000) 9 
 
suggesting an extremely narrow range of income/consumption among the (often) small (in 
proportionate terms) middle class in developing countries.  The Ginis are clearly correlated with 
the overall income range within a country for this group, which is in turn correlated with the 
absolute size of the group.  The Gini for the U.S. middle class is, not surprisingly, much higher, 
at .38– indeed it is higher than the Gini coefficient across all households in many countries.. That 
reflects the fact that along with the greater relative size of the middle class in the U.S., $10 a day 
at the bottom of the class, as noted above, is actually well below what would be considered 
middle class in high-income countries, and $312, the daily income per capita at the top of the 
class, is 30 times greater than $10.  Differences between the bottom and top income/consumption 
households are probably too great to pretend that the group as a whole represents a single class.  
Indeed in the U.S. the terms lower and upper middle class are now widely used.  The Gini for the 
middle class in Sweden is lower, at .23, but still higher than in most developing countries.   
 
This (indispensable) middle class and growth 
 
Defined in this manner, an increase in the size and economic power of the middle class is likely 
to signal that the underlying growth is based on wealth creation and productivity gains in private 
activities and is thus self-sustaining and transformative (politically as well as economically, as 
the more powerful middle demands government policies conducive to wealth creation), as 
opposed to being driven largely by exploitation of natural resources, by remittances, or by 
infusions of external aid.  
 
 
Country estimates: economic size and share of the global middle class in developing 
countries   
 
Figure 2 shows the economic command of the middle class so defined for selected countries, and 
the change in that indicator between 1990 (or close years to 1990) and 2005.  (See also Table 3, 
which also includes the size of the middle class and the change in size between the two years. In 
the discussion below I refer mostly to the economic command variable, which is generally higher 
and shows a greater increase or decline compared to the size variable.)   
 
The estimates are based on household surveys in developing countries of income or consumption 
in purchasing power terms for various years around 1990 and 2005, using the most recent (2005) 
PPP updates.  Estimated distributions of household income or consumption for each country/year 
are available from the World Bank‗s online poverty analysis tool, PovcalNet.
26 The resulting 
income/consumption country averages are lower than GDP per capita estimates, which include 
non-household production (and associated non-household income), and the overall estimates are 
systematically lower for countries where the data are for consumption rather than income.  For 
these reasons alone it is not possible to compare the resulting country averages to standard 
measures of GDP per capita, or to make comparisons across countries – including of the size of 
                                                      
26 PovcalNet provides the estimated distribution parameters and the survey-based average monthly 
income/consumption data for each survey, allowing calculation of the size and the share of income/consumption for 




the middle classes between the consumption-based and income-based country estimates.  Perusal 
of the survey-based estimates also indicates less growth in household income/consumption than 
would be expected based on average measured GDP per capita growth over the relevant periods 
in some countries.  In short, while the resulting estimates allow useful description in the broad 
sense, they are best thought of as illustrative not dispositive.   
 
Several observations are in order.  First is the lack of an (indispensable) middle class in some 
countries, and its relatively small size and economic command in low-income compared to 
middle-income developing countries.  
 
In the figure, the daily per capita consumption/income of households in each country at the 95
th 
percentile is shown. By my definition, Thailand and urban China in 1990 and urban India and 
Indonesia in 1990 and (about) 2005 have no middle class at all.  In other words, all households in 
those country years with consumption at or greater than $10 a day are in the top 5 percent of all 
households and are thus in this context ―rich‖. (The histograms included in the Appendix are a 
dramatic illustration of the missing middle class in many developing countries and its small size 
where it is present.)  
 
(A long parenthetical comment: But what about India? 
 
The resulting numbers will strike some readers as too low, for example for Thailand in 1990 and 
especially for the ―country‖ of urban India.  Any definition of the middle class that suggests 
there was no middle class at all in urban India (in 2005) is not credible.  
 
First, it is likely that a large portion of people conventionally viewed as ―middle class‖ in India 
are among the most affluent 5 percent of people that I have defined as ―rich‖.  McKinsey Global 
Institute (2007) reports a a  ―middle class‖, defined  as people with disposable incomes from 
about $4,200 to $21,000, or about $11-$55 per day, of about 50 million people in India, which is 
less than  5 percent of India‘s total population of about 1.3 billion people.
27 Second, the survey 
data for India record consumption not income; consumption is for most households, particularly 
affluent households, consistently below income, which helps explain some of the shortfall in 
measured numbers of middle class people.  Third, the distribution of income in India is relatively 
less concentrated than that of many developing countries with larger middle classes, for example 
in Latin America; that suggests that the appropriate cutoff for ―rich‖ households is above the 95
th 
percentile in India (and other South Asian countries). Indeed as noted above, ideally the 




                                                      
27 Shukla (2008) based on surveys of the National Council of Applied Economic Research (NCAER) estimates there 
are 120 million people in India in the middle class. 
28 As shown in Figure 2 per capita consumption for India at the 95
th percentile is $5 a day.  It is only at the 99
th 
percentile that, using our estimates, per capita consumption reaches $10; above the 98
th percentile, the functional 
form used to estimate the entire distribution probably dominates what are likely to be very noisy survey data at the 
top of the consumption distribution. 
29 In addition, our numbers reflect recent large downward adjustments in average dollar income in purchasing power 
terms for India (and China) based on 2005 price data that have only recently been incorporated;  the new Penn 
World Tables with these PPP adjustments have not received yet the kind of scrutiny earlier adjustments are now 
getting (Johnson et al, 2009).  11 
 
Among countries for which estimates are based on income, not consumption, data, Honduras in 
1990 also had no middle class.  Honduras (and Bolivia) are among the richest of those countries, 
most of which are in sub-Saharan Africa, classified by the World Bank as ―low-income‖, that is 
with income per capita of less than about $800 a year at market exchange rates.  Most still had no 
(indispensable) middle class in 2005. As in India, it is likely that in sub-Saharan Africa  virtually 
all households in urban areas with apparent middle-class status (many as civil servants or 
working with the aid community or international NGOs) are among the 5 percent most affluent 
in their countries.  Where 40 – 60 percent of all people are living below the international poverty 
line of $1.25 a day, this is not as surprising as it seems at first glance.  It does suggest something 
about the political challenge inherent in creating and maintaining accountable government – 
particularly where a high proportion of the richest  5 percent of a nation‘s population are 
members of the political class, that is are directly or indirectly dependent on government for their 
income, whether as civil servants or working for parastatals or for formal institutions highly 
dependent on public policies such as banks and natural resource producers.
30  
 
The (indispensable) middle class is larger in most middle-income countries. Where it does exist 
in the developing world (leaving out the former socialist economies of Eastern Europe), its 
command of income or consumption in many countries is still small compared to the command 
of the ―rich‖: 7 compared to 18 percent in China, 20 compared to 30 percent in South Africa, and 
26 compared to 35 percent in Colombia (Table 7).  Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Russia and Turkey are 
interesting exceptions, where the middle class economic command is equal to or greater than that 
of the ―rich‖.  They may be the countries where in political terms it is possible to distinguish 
three classes: the poor, the middle and the rich.  Elsewhere in the developing world, the relevant 
political economy might better distinguish between the rich – with political salience -- and the 
rest.  
 
A second observation has to do with the change in the economic command of the middle class 
over the period 1990 to 2005.  In that period (of healthy growth almost everywhere and 
increasing integration of developing countries into the global economy) the economic command 
of the (indispensable) middle class increased in most middle-income countries, and notably 
increased in urban China.  Exceptions include urban Argentina, Venezuela (income data) and 
Morocco and South Africa (consumption data). Though over the relevant period overall 
household consumption in South Africa grew at 2.35 percent and in Morocco at 3.39 percent 
(based on the household survey data), the size and economic command of the middle class 
declined in those countries.  Sweden and the United States both also saw a decline in the 
economic command of the middle class – a phenomenon widely observed for the United States 
in the context of the 2008 presidential campaign (and often blamed on ―free trade‖ and 
―globalization‖). The increase in income inequality and the stagnation of median wages in the 
United States (since the early 1980s) have been attributed among other things to the decline in 
access to good education (Goldin and Katz, 2007); the decline in Sweden may be more of a 
surprise.  It is notable that the proportion of income commanded by the middle class in Sweden 
                                                      
30 Birdsall, 200?) presents data suggesting the heavy reliance of the top quintile in low-income countries on 
employment by the state or state-owned enterprises. 12 
 
is higher than the United States, despite its lower per capita income; in 2005 average per capita 
income was about $32,000 in Sweden and about $42,000 in the United States.
31 
 
Third, the overall command of the middle class in all the developing countries is far lower than 
in the Sweden and the United States.  This is mostly due to lower average income across the 
entire distributions. To the extent that the middle class more than the poor or the rich constitutes 
the bulwark of accountable government and sustained economic growth, it suggests the nature of 
the challenge in developing countries. Only in Chile, Russia and Mexico – the figures for 
Mexico and Russia are for consumption and would be higher in income terms) is the middle 
class command of total income/consumption close to or greater than 40 percent, compared to 
about 80 percent in the United States and close to 90 percent in Sweden.     
 
Table 3 summarizes our middle class indicators along with more traditional measures of income 
distribution.  The middle class indicators provide information additional to that embedded in the 
Gini coefficient and other traditional measures of income distribution.  For example, the change 
over the periods studied in the economic command of the middle class is not necessarily in the 
opposite direction as the change in the Gini
32 as might be expected – that is an increase in the 
middle class does is not always associated with a decline in overall inequality.  In India and 
Brazil a rising middle class is not surprisingly associated with a declining Gini.  However, for 
urban China (treated here as a country) the notable increase in middle class command (from zero 
in 1990) is associated with a substantial increase in the overall Gini, and that is also the case in 
Ecuador.  In South Africa, the decline in middle class command is associated with a decrease in 
the overall Gini.  The same is true for other measures of inequality (not shown).
33 
 
Characteristics of the global middle class 
 
Table 4 provides information on the education of household heads and the size of households for 
the three groups (poor, middle class and rich) for countries based on survey data (the Living 
Standards Measurement Surveys, most from the 1990s and thus not reflecting the increases since 
in the size and command of the middle class shown in Figure 2).  Other than the anomalous 
education numbers for Indonesia, the tables accord with priors.  Except for Nicaragua and 
Guatemala, the middle class in most countries has close to or above 10 years of education 
(measured as grade completed in most surveys).  The averages shown are for all heads of 
households. Using information on the distribution of income to define the three groups (low-
income, middle class and rich) using DHS data, it is possible to compute years of schooling of 
household heads (aged 20-55) for each group.  In Turkey in 2005 , 65 percent of household 
heads in middle class households had 11 or more years of education, and 32 percent had 16 years 
or more, compared to 26 percent and 5 percent respectively of adults in lower-income 
households.  These averages are below but approaching those for the middle class in the more 
                                                      
31 The quoted incomes are GNI per capita, PPP (current international $), as given by the World Development 
Indicators 2008. 
32 The Ginis shown are calculated from the same data (PovCal) used to identify the middle class.  The Ginis match 
reasonably well the Ginis published in the World Bank World Development Indicators. 
33 In the case of India, South Africa, and Russia, the comparison is between an income-based Gini and changes in 
middle class command based on consumption survey data.  13 
 
affluent OECD countries (where a high school education, about 12 years, is more of a minimum 
for middle class status).  
 
In contrast, adults in ―middle-class‖ households defined as those above the international poverty 
line of $2, using the definition of Banerjee and Duflo (income of between $2 and $10 a day) are 
far less educated.  They are likely to have attained educational levels no greater than and 
possibly below the averages for their countries of just 4.2 years in countries of South Asia, 5.7 
years in Latin America, and 6.5 years in East Asia (compared to 9.8 years in advanced 
countries). 
34   Those levels of education imply illiteracy in many low-income countries given 
scores on internationally comparable tests (Filmer, Hasan, and Pritchett 2006), so that whether in 
terms of income security or sufficient literacy to acquire information relevant to voting decisions, 
they are not likely to be a relevant group in terms of their economic interests or political ability 
to support institutions and policies associated with good governance, the rule of law, property 
rights and more generally a level playing field.   
 
 Table 5 shows the average number of people in households for the poor, middle class, and rich.  
Poor households are generally larger – to some extent reflecting the definition of 
income/consumption of household income per capita.   
 
Table 6 shows the employment status of our middle class, compared to the poor and the rich, for 
the Dominican Republic and Turkey. In Turkey the poor compared to the middle class are more 
likely to be self-employed or receiving daily/seasonal wages vs. being salaried workers; between 
the middle class and the rich the difference in percentages of ―regular‖ waged or salaried 
workers is relatively small, reflecting the middle-income status of the diversified Turkish 
economy.  In the Dominican Republic, the poor are more likely than the middle class to be self-
employed or domestic workers. There is a surprisingly small distinction in ―employee‖ status 
between the poor and the middle class however – suggesting that many households with 
income/consumption above the conventional $2 day line but below my $10 minimum threshold 
enjoy regular if low-wage participation in the formal sector.   
 
It is unfortunate that typical household surveys of income and consumption do not include 
information on public vs. private sector employment – which makes it impossible to assess the 
extent to which the income/consumption-based middle class as I have defined it is highly 
dependent directly or indirectly on the state for employment. 
 
Finally returning to Table 1, at least for urban Indonesia and urban India, the items owned that 
appear to distinguish between the low-income vs. the middle class are a refrigerator and a 
telephone.  However, the choice of assets for this table was largely arbitrary (principal 
components analysis is not appropriate since the information on assets is not common across the 
country surveys) and the number of countries shown is limited.  It would be convenient to have a 
single, globally traded consumption good that would reliably ―mark‖ the indispensable middle 
class, but this is not it.    
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Does absolute not relative size matter? 
 
As an indispensable political class for its likely alignment of its own economic interests with 
sustainable economic policy and reasonable governance, perhaps what matters within countries 
is not the relative size or income/consumption share but the absolute size of the middle income 
population (and its absolute dollar command of income or consumption goods and services). In 
most developing countries the middle class by my definition is small in absolute terms.  Only 
Russia, Mexico and Brazil (among countries studied) have more than 25 million people in the 
middle class; urban China has not quite 20 million (Table 7).  By this measure Brazil and Mexico 
have a larger middle class than China, and Russia the largest among all the countries analyzed.  
If we treat all of sub-Saharan Africa has a single country, the numbers in Table 7 imply that of its 
approximate 300 million people, just 3.6 million in South Africa are ―middle class‖ in the 
political sense.  Of the 15 million I have called ―rich‖ because they are in the top 5 percent of 
households in their own countries, perhaps another 5 to 10 million should be counted as middle 
class – suggesting at the moment a maximum of 20 million middle class people in the region, 
similar to urban China (treated as a country), but below the numbers in Mexico and Brazil. 
 
From the point of view of the consumer market and for some aspects of economic policy such as 
openness to foreign direct investment on which the interests of the rich and the middle class are 
likely to be aligned, it may be the absolute size of the middle class combined with the absolute 
size of the ―rich‖ within a country that is most salient. Table 7 shows the absolute size of the 
middle class plus the rich in countries around 2005.  India‘s 55 million and China‘s 83 million 
(combining urban and rural in both cases) stand out.   
 
The last two columns of Table 7 allow comparison in countries with absolutely large middle 
class and/or rich populations of the relative economic command of the two groups, as a kind of 
counterpoint to the view that it is their combined absolute income that matters for the politics of 
economic policy.  As noted above, other than Sweden and the United States, in only a few 
developing countries does the middle class share exceed that of the rich.    
 
 
Implications for policy – domestic and international 
 
Does making a distinction between pro-poor growth and growth that increases the size and 
command of the ppp middle class (to remind: the potentially politically powerful) have any 
implications for policy?  Are there any tradeoffs between policies that favor the middle class and 
those that favor the poor, or is a focus on the middle class merely a simple extension of caring 
about the poor?   
 
Macroeconomic policy?  At the most basic level – in terms of sensible macroeconomic policy – 
the distinction is not important. Inflation, high interest rates, overvalued exchange rates 
(increasingly a thing of the past), hurt the poor and the ppp middle class alike.
35  The increases 
(1990 -2005) in the size and economic command of the middle class in Chile, Mexico and 
Turkey, suggest that eventually – sometimes with a long lag – better macro policy (combined 
with a benign external environment and a commodity boom) brings growth that is inclusive both 
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reducing poverty and increasing the size of the middle class.  At the same time, for a period 
when the general trend across the developing world has been improved macroeconomic 
fundamentals, it is not possible at this level of crude analysis to distinguish across developing 
countries between the effect of good policy from the effect of overall economic growth (due in 
part to good policy), since the size of the middle class over the period and across countries is 
highly correlated with average per capita income for the country-years studied (Figure 4). In 
short, growth is not only ―good for the poor‖
36 but is apparently good for building the 
indispensable middle class.  
 
More to the point, for most low-income countries, the distinction between the poor and near-
poor, living under $10 a day, and the non-existent middle class, is by definition irrelevant.  All 
but the very rich, if not absolutely poor by the international standard of $1.25 a day, are in 
income terms living at levels well below poverty lines in the OECD countries.  
 
Volatility and vulnerability.  In welfare terms the poor suffer most when negative shocks derail 
an economy – whether those are external financial and economic or terms of trade or weather or 
internal political shocks.  We know less about the extent to which such shocks set back an 
increase in the size and economic command of an independent middle class – partly because 
there is little consensus and therefore little systematic data on who or what that middle class is.  
Ravallion (2008) shows convincingly that in the period 1990-2002, almost a billion people 
moved from income just below to just above $2 a day – mostly in Asia (half in China). They are 
obviously vulnerable to the ongoing global recession.  I defined the indispensable middle class in 
terms of its members‘ relative sense of economic security compared to those at lower income, in 
the face of typical cyclical downturns however, not in the face of a global recession.  A rough 
estimate of the total size of this middle class in the developing world, including Russia, would be 
about 200 million (Table 7) of the almost 6 billion people in the developing world.  To the extent 
they are heavily dependent for their security on formal sector employment (Table 6), particularly 
in tradable sectors, those numbers are likely to decline – and there are likely to be considerable 
tradeoffs between protecting their jobs and incomes during the downturn vs. extending in time 
and scope safety net programs for those already at lower incomes.   
 
The tradeoff may be about the politics, especially in low-income and oil economies. However in 
the absence of this middle class the question is where good governance (and sensible economic 
policy) comes from.  The relatively small size of the group in many low-income countries 
(including rural India and China were they to be countries) suggests considerable vulnerability to 
bad politics, including during periods of economic growth that over time is likely to undermine 
what in retrospect will have been unsustainable growth.  Zimbabwe and Cote d‘Ivoire come to 
mind, and perhaps Pakistan. Put another way for low-income countries there is a considerable 
premium on honest and competent leadership and in general on whatever it takes to sustain good 
government from the top – in the absence of the pressure for accountability from below.  
Alternative sources of accountability include market pressures for countries dependent on 
foreign investment and trade (in very small economies private foreign investors have 
considerable leverage, often untapped, in demanding the rule of law).  Countries at higher 
average income levels that are heavily dependent on oil or other natural resources are similarly 
vulnerable – Venezuela where the middle class has shrunk (Figure 2) comes to mind.    For the 
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low-income countries that are heavily dependent on aid, primarily in sub-Saharan Africa and 
Central America, this suggests the logic of donors favoring those where the evidence of effective 
and honest leadership is clear – be it in terms of proportion of budgets spent on education and 
health, minimal corruption, fair elections or other measures. (The United States‘ Millennium 
Challenge Account program is an example where this basis for aid is the most explicit.)    
 
Microeconomic policies: taxes, expenditures, trade and jobs, foreign aid. At the same time, in 
most developing countries, a singular focus on the poor is likely to ignore tradeoffs that matter 
for the incipient or small and fragile middle class. Choices on the expenditure side are the most 
obvious.  There is the example of loss of political support for narrowly targeted cash transfer 
programs
37; and less studied but equivalent the likely withdrawal of middle class support for 
spending overall on education in Latin America, when implicit subsidies at the higher education 
level from which they had benefited were reduced - - even though the truly rich had no doubt 
benefited far more.  Perhaps the biggest tradeoff occurs when the middle class loses trust in 
government‘s ability to spend effectively at all, and withdraws support for tax collection in 
general. 
38There are also obvious tradeoffs on the revenue side, between taxes on labor and trade 
taxes (the latter usually a last-resort for lack of administrative capacity anyway) and taxes on 
capital and property (which may hurt most small businesses), and on how progressive the overall 
tax structure is.   
 
Finally, for countries that have become heavily dependent on aid, there is the risk that aid to 
finance services for the poor keeps upward pressure on the exchange rate, hurting prospects for 
small businesses; though those pressures can be managed at the macroeconomic level by 
intelligent fine-tuning, that requires a steady hand at the top – on which there is already a scarcity 
premium in low-income countries.    
 
In the end, as noted above, it is not possible to generalize about the possible tensions or tradeoffs 
between strictly pro-poor and more inclusive ―middle-class‖ growth policies.  They need to be 
assessed policy by policy in each country, and are likely to change over time as circumstances 
change.  The implication is that policymakers in developing countries (and their international 
supporters and advisers) should be more systematic than has been the case in the last several 
decades in considering weighted welfare outcomes when selecting and fine-tuning economic 
policies, rather than relying either on unweighted growth outcomes or overly weighted poverty 
outcomes.   
 
Doing so systematically, however, will not be possible until there is far better information on the 
characteristics of the middle class in developing countries – and preceding that a consensus 
among economists on the concept itself.   
 
My own conclusion, based in part on the combination of small numbers with their growth in the 
boom years since 1990, is that the real tradeoff in policy design is far better thought of in 
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on the latter.  
38 Birdsall, de la Torre and Menezes (2007) provide a detailed discussion of this tradeoff in the case of Latin 
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developing countries as a tradeoff between the rich and the rest rather than, as has been the 
mindset in the international community for several decades, the absolute poor and the rest.  The 
small size of what I have presumptively called the indispensable middle class in the developing 
world should be a telling reminder that the overwhelming majority of people in the developing 
world are poor by Western standards, and that in most developing countries, only a tiny 
proportion of households at the top of the income distribution, enjoy what Westerners think of as 
middle class living standards. The policy tradeoff in most countries is therefore usually between 
short-term stability or high aggregate growth that preserves the status quo benefiting a small 
minority at the top of the income distribution vs. the political risks and lower short-run growth of 
financial, tax, social insurance, land market and other policies that are conducive to building a 
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Table 1: Assets of Income/Consumption Groups for Selected Countries 
 
Percentage of Classified Population Owning a Particular Asset 
   Indonesia, urban  Turkey  India, urban 
   Poor  Middle  Rich  Poor  Middle  Rich  Poor  Middle  Rich 
Refrigerator  14  86  100  92  99  100  15  89  99 
Car  1  22  98  8  41  85  1  16  75 
Bicycle  40  49  69  11  26  46  43  47  55 
Telephone  8  73  100  68  95  100  10  68  97 
                    Source: Author's calculations based on DHS data and Povcal distributions 
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Table 2: Gini Coefficients of Income/Consumption of Middle Class, Selected Countries 
   I/C 
Pseudo-Gini for 
Middle Class 
Country  1990  2005  1990  2005 
Ghana  C  C  -  - 
India, urban  C  C  -  - 
Indonesia, urban  C  C  -  - 
Morocco  C  C  0.047  0.039 
China urban  C  C  -  0.034 
Thailand  C  C  -  0.082 
Turkey  C  C  0.080  0.109 
South Africa  C  C  0.127  0.103 
Mexico  I  C  0.142  0.168 
Russian Federation  C  C  0.146  0.141 
Honduras  I  I  -  0.080 
Bolivia  I  I  0.076  0.122 
Paraguay  I  I  0.048  0.144 
Colombia  I  I  0.101  0.131 
Ecuador  I  I  0.090  0.123 
Brazil  I  I  0.168  0.162 
Venezuela  I  I  0.131  0.040 
Argentina, urban  I  I  0.199  0.185 
Chile  I  I  0.162  0.201 
Sweden  I  I  0.235  0.231 
United States  I  I  0.325  0.380 
Source: Author's calculations, using Povcal data.  A dash indicates 
that there was no middle class for accociated country-year. 
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Table 3: Distribution Statistics for Selected Countries  
 
Country 
   MC Size  MC Share 
Gini  Theil  Difference from 1990 to 2005 
 
(proportion of population) 
(proportion of 
income/consumption) 
I/C  1990  2005  1990  2005  1990  2005  1990  2005  MC Size  MC Share  Gini 
Ghana  C  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.381  0.428  0.24  0.31  0.000  0.000  0.046 
India, urban  C  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.356  0.376  0.21  0.24  0.000  0.000  0.020 
Indonesia, urban  C  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.347  0.399  0.20  0.25  0.000  0.000  0.053 
Morocco  C  0.044  0.035  0.098  0.073  0.392  0.411  0.26  0.23  -0.009  -0.025  0.019 
China, urban  C  0.000  0.034  0.000  0.070  0.256  0.347  0.10  0.20  0.034  0.070  0.091 
Thailand  C  0.000  0.087  0.000  0.174  0.438  0.425  0.33  0.31  0.087  0.174  -0.014 
Turkey  C  0.101  0.159  0.176  0.274  0.441  0.432  0.16  0.30  0.058  0.098  -0.008 
South Africa  C  0.096  0.076  0.243  0.203  0.595  0.580  0.63  0.59  -0.019  -0.040  -0.016 
Mexico  C  0.177  0.280  0.299  0.405  0.553  0.483  0.35  0.35  0.103  0.107  -0.070 
Russian Federation  C  0.244  0.298  0.363  0.439  0.486  0.375  0.27  0.23  0.055  0.076  -0.111 
Honduras  I  0.000  0.068  0.000  0.157  0.575  0.569  0.47  0.50  0.068  0.157  -0.006 
Bolivia  I  0.082  0.122  0.176  0.254  0.420  0.582  0.29  0.56  0.039  0.078  0.162 
Paraguay  I  0.048  0.180  0.109  0.315  0.397  0.541  0.26  0.44  0.132  0.206  0.143 
Colombia  I  0.105  0.135  0.191  0.255  0.576  0.590  0.20  0.43  0.030  0.063  0.014 
Ecuador  I  0.097  0.139  0.198  0.257  0.505  0.538  0.40  0.40  0.042  0.059  0.034 
Brazil  I  0.164  0.194  0.317  0.331  0.606  0.566  0.65  0.47  0.030  0.013  -0.040 
Venezuela  I  0.206  0.032  0.348  0.081  0.441  0.482  0.33  0.39  -0.174  -0.267  0.041 
Argentina, urban  I  0.391  0.305  0.532  0.464  0.454  0.500  0.35  0.42  -0.086  -0.068  0.047 
Chile  I  0.206  0.327  0.325  0.419  0.557  0.551  0.35  0.26  0.121  0.095  -0.006 
Sweden  I  0.950  0.950  0.904  0.879  0.240  0.257  0.09  0.11  0.000  -0.025  0.017 
United States  I  0.938  0.909  0.844  0.812  0.372  0.448  0.22  0.33  -0.029  -0.032  0.077 
Notes: Authors calculations using Povcal data 25 
 
 
Table 4: Average Education of Household Head, by class (Selected Countries and Years) 
                          Education of Household Head 
   Year  Source  MC Size  Poor  Middle  Rich 
Malawi  2004  LSMS  0.000  4.58 
 
9.64 
Madagascar  1993  LSMS  0.000  3.50 
 
4.05 
Nigeria  2004  LSMS  0.000  2.72 
 
4.60 
Indonesia  2000  LSMS  0.000  8.19 
 
14.45 
Bangladesh  2000  LSMS  0.000  3.29 
 
7.06 
Vietnam  1998  LSMS  0.000  6.72 
 
7.62 
Pakistan  2001  LSMS  0.000  4.10 
 
8.87 
Nepal  2003  LSMS  0.000  3.20 
 
9.61 
Ghana  1998  LSMS  0.000  4.71 
 
8.21 
Nicaragua  2001  LSMS  0.035  4.01  7.43  8.33 
Albania  2005  LSMS  0.060  8.91  11.37  12.17 
Ecuador  1998  LSMS  0.027  7.00  12.03  9.50 
Guatemala  2000  LSMS  0.119  3.33  7.32  9.80 
Bulgaria  2001  LSMS  0.090  9.97  12.06  11.21 
Panama  2003  LSMS  0.280  6.65  9.94  12.92 
Morocco  2004  DHS  0.035  3.06  9.24  11.73 
Colombia  2005  DHS  0.135  7.37  10.95  13.62 
Peru  2004-2008  DHS  0.137  6.75  11.23  13.47 
Dominican Republic  2007  DHS  0.167  7.88  11.29  14.43 
Turkey  2003  DHS  0.159  5.98  10.01  13.28 
              Notes: For countries with no middle class, the education measure is left blank; the "poor" represent 
households below the 95th percentile on the income/consumption distribution.   
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              Table 5: Number of Household Members, for Poor, Middle Class, and Rich           
(Selected Countries and Years) 
                    Average Per Capita 
Household Income  MC Size 
Number of HH Members 
   Year  Poor  Middle  Rich 
Malawi  2004  $1.12   0.00%  4.58 
 
2.88 
Madagascar  1993  $1.19   0.00%  5.11 
 
2.68 
Nigeria  2004  $1.30   0.00%  5.06 
 
3.29 
Indonesia  2000  $1.36   0.00%  5.40 
 
2.79 
Bangladesh  2000  $1.40   0.00%  5.23 
 
4.23 
Vietnam  1998  $1.64   0.00%  4.73 
 
4.28 
Pakistan  2001  $1.80   0.00%  7.33 
 
4.48 
Nepal  2003  $1.85   0.00%  5.24 
 
3.67 
Ghana  1998  $2.06   0.00%  4.38 
 
2.29 
Nicaragua  2001  $4.21   3.50%  5.56  3.47  3.03 
Albania  2005  $5.33   6.00%  4.33  3.38  3.46 
Ecuador  1998  $6.00   2.70%  4.56  3.08  4.26 
Guatemala  2000  $6.08   11.90%  5.48  3.94  2.81 
Bulgaria  2001  $6.81   9.00%  3.14  2.34  2.42 
Panama  2003  $9.54   28.00%  4.71  3.16  2.26 
              Source: LSMS household survey data; the average income measure is daily. 
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Table 6: Household Characteristics for Occupation for Selected Countries 
Turkey (2003)          
Occupation Categories  Poor  Middle  Rich 
Employer (10+ employees)  0.007  0.026  0.080 
Employer (1-9 employees)  0.050  0.139  0.219 
Waged worker (regular)  0.320  0.362  0.310 
Salaried, government official (regular)  0.096  0.268  0.266 
Daily wage (seasonal/temporary)  0.092  0.014  0.004 
Self employed (regular)  0.330  0.165  0.106 
Self employed (irregular)  0.084  0.020  0.011 
Unpaid family worker  0.021  0.005  0.004 
 
Dominican Republic (2007) 
Periodicity of Pay  Poor  Middle  Rich 
Hour  0.003  0.001  0.000 
Day  0.269  0.111  0.045 
Week  0.171  0.131  0.096 
By week  0.100  0.102  0.069 
Month  0.457  0.656  0.790 
        Dominican Republic (2007) 
Occupation Categories  Poor  Middle  Rich 
Employee  0.491  0.581  0.568 
Employer  0.070  0.115  0.192 
Self employee  0.353  0.260  0.222 
Member of cooperative  0.002  0.002  0.000 
Work for family member  0.011  0.006  0.007 
Domestic work  0.074  0.037  0.011 
        Source: Author‘s calculations, using DHS data. Reported figures 
as a proportion of total population. 
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Table 7: Absolute Size of Middle Class and Middle Class plus Rich  






MC Share of 
National Income 
Rich Share of 
National Income 
Ghana (2005.5)  C  0  1,126,751  0.00  0.22 
India, rural (2004.5)  C  0  39,000,000  0.00  0.18 
India, urban (2004.5)  C  0  15,700,000  0.00  0.20 
Indonesia, rural (2005)  C  0  5,723,481  0.00  0.16 
Indonesia, urban (2005)  C  0  5,304,420  0.00  0.22 
Morocco (2007)  C  1,044,183  2,551,319  0.07  0.23 
China, rural (2005)  C  0  38,900,000  0.00  0.19 
China, urban (2005)  C  17,800,000  44,100,000  0.07  0.18 
Thailand (2004)  C  5,490,658  8,640,803  0.17  0.23 
Turkey (2005)  C  11,400,000  15,000,000  0.27  0.23 
South Africa (2000)  C  3,574,911  5,919,533  0.20  0.30 
Mexico (2006)  C  28,900,000  34,000,000  0.41  0.27 
Russian Federation (2005)  C  42,700,000  49,900,000  0.44  0.18 
Honduras (2005)  I  461,337  803,043  0.16  0.32 
Bolivia (2005)  I  1,115,742  1,574,843  0.25  0.32 
Paraguay (2005)  I  1,060,418  1,355,351  0.32  0.30 
Colombia (2003)  I  6,083,750  8,331,040  0.26  0.35 
Ecuador (2005)  I  1,815,542  2,468,592  0.26  0.31 
Brazil (2005)  I  36,300,000  45,700,000  0.33  0.33 
Venezuela, RB (2003)  I  857,582  2,186,432  0.08  0.24 
Argentina, urban (2005)  I  10,600,000  12,400,000  0.46  0.25 
Chile (2003)  I  5,321,656  6,136,412  0.42  0.34 
Sweden (2002)  I  8,572,838  9,024,040  0.88  0.14 
United States (2000)  I  269,000,000  284,000,000  0.81  0.19 
            Notes: Population data comes from WDI.  MC plus rich includes all households with per capita daily income above 
$10/day and/or above the 95th percentile on the income/consumption distribution. 
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 Figure 1: Ventile Ratios for Selected Country-years 
 
 
Notes: The countries are ordered by WDI mean income in 2005 – lowest to highest, left to right.  The legend entry 
―(20/19)‖ indicates the ratio of average household income of the 20
th ventile (above 95
th percentile) to the 19
th 
ventile (between the 90
th and 95
th percentile), effectively showing the increasing slope of the top-end of the Povcal 
Lorenz curves. 
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Figure 2: Proportion of Total Income/Consumption Held by the Middle Class 
 
 
Notes: The countries are ordered by WDI mean income in 2005 – lowest to highest, left to right.  The dollar amount in 
parentheses indicates daily per capita income of individuals at the 95
th percentile of the country‘s income/consumption 
distribution, as reported by PovcalNet, in 2005.  The survey data used are from the closest available survey year to 1990 or 2005. 
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APPENDIX Table 1: Summary Statistics and Income Ratios for Selected Countries (2005) 
 
 










Share  (20/19)  (19/18)  (18/17)  (10/9)  (9/8)  (8/7) 
Ghana  C  77.7  203.14  0  0  3.15  1.31  1.19  4.16  1.34  1.24 
India, urban  C  62.43  152.11  0  0  3.03  1.29  1.18  3.94  1.32  1.21 
Indonesia, urban  C  89.1  216.18  0  0  4.18  1.3  1.18  5.56  1.33  1.22 
Morocco  C  161.42  385.32  0.035  0.073  4.03  1.29  1.18  5.34  1.32  1.22 
China, urban  C  161.83  372.53  0.034  0.07  2.48  1.25  1.16  3.1  1.27  1.19 
Thailand  C  190.47  502.14  0.087  0.174  3.51  1.33  1.2  4.75  1.37  1.25 
Turkey  C  234.6  599.77  0.159  0.274  3.89  1.3  1.19  5.17  1.34  1.23 
South Africa  C  153.14  569.25  0.076  0.203  2.5  1.49  1.33  3.73  1.64  1.45 
Mexico  C  330.37  891.25  0.28  0.405  4.64  1.35  1.22  6.46  1.4  1.27 
Russian Federation  C  300.95  752.77  0.298  0.439  1.99  1.27  1.17  2.5  1.31  1.22 
Honduras  I  163.9  495.72  0.068  0.157  5.02  1.39  1.25  7.29  1.47  1.34 
Bolivia  I  203.51  645.33  0.122  0.254  4.94  1.41  1.26  7.25  1.5  1.36 
Paraguay  I  256.62  745.82  0.18  0.315  4.86  1.38  1.24  6.95  1.45  1.32 
Colombia  I  231.62  682.45  0.135  0.255  4.25  1.41  1.26  6.2  1.5  1.35 
Ecuador  I  229.33  649.66  0.139  0.257  4.51  1.37  1.24  6.41  1.44  1.31 
Brazil  I  278.68  836.06  0.194  0.331  5.09  1.41  1.26  7.48  1.49  1.35 
Venezuela  I  136.02  386.07  0.032  0.081  3.04  1.33  1.21  4.08  1.38  1.27 
Argentina, urban  I  332.99  992.89  0.305  0.464  3.1  1.36  1.23  4.27  1.43  1.3 
Chile  I  412.3  1097.2  0.327  0.419  3.2  1.38  1.24  4.48  1.45  1.31 
Sweden  I  2020.05  3871.52  0.95  0.879  2.18  1.19  1.11  2.56  1.19  1.13 
United States  I  3347.66  9504.35  0.909  0.812  1.62  1.28  1.19  2.02  1.36  1.27 